proached to spearhead a capital campaign at UCF to fund a new Center for Environmental Policy Analysis (CEPA). The experimental design, which includes valuation decisions from nearly 300 subjects randomly placed into one of six treatment cells, permits an examination of the comparative static effects of varying social isolation while holding the other important facets of the valuation instrument constant. Our baseline treatments ask two different groups of respondents to vote Yes or No on contributing $20 to provide start-up capital for CEPA (one treatment hypothetical and one treatment actual). In these two baseline treatments, similar to many practical methods of contingent valuation (CV) exercises that are carried out in practice (e.g., in-person, mail, or telephone), it is important to recognize that only the experimenter can observe each individual's response. In the third and fourth treatments, denoted Randomized Response, we again ask a hypothetical or actual question concerning a $20 contribution, but we relax the degree of social pressure by using a randomized response format, which via delinking the observed and voting response ensures the subject that her stated preferences are unidentifiable.2 These particular treatments resemble use of an anonymous ballot box approach to obtain individual values. Our final two treatments, labeled Peer Group, considerably decrease subject anonymity by randomly choosing 10 people to stand up and inform the group of their voting decision. These treatments bear resemblance to contingent surveys performed with small groups (or poorly controlled Web-based surveys).
The experimental results are interesting. Consonant with some previous studies, we observe signs of hypothetical bias. More importantly, we find that the difference between hypothetical and actual voting decisions is of roughly the same magnitude as the difference between actual voting decisions across treatments that vary 2 The randomized response approach to asking sensitive survey questions was introduced by Stanley Warner (1965) . 741 social isolation. For example, across the three elicitation formats (Baseline, Randomized Response, and Peer Group) the largest percentage difference between Yes votes in the actual and hypothetical treatments is 14.5 percent; whereas the percentage differences across the actual voting decisions in the three formats are as large as 18 percent. This finding calls into question results from the plethora of validation studies that assume responses in the real payment treatment represent true preferences. We believe our results are fundamental to understanding the received evidence for mechanism design in CV, as they serve to highlight the notion that utilitarian elements and strategic reciprocity (e.g., from publicly advertising one's own goodwill) are confounded in interpreting signals of value, and that the potential biases introduced may be much larger than many expect.
I. Background, Experimental Design, and Hypotheses
One hallmark of public policy decision-making around the globe is a comparison of the costs and benefits of proposed policies. In the United States, President Clinton's Executive Order 12866, which reaffirmed the earlier executive order from the Reagan Administration, explicitly requires federal agencies to consider costs, benefits, and economic impacts of regulations prior to their implementation.3 Given their flexibility to measure the monetary value of a wide variety of goods and services, CV methods have become a popular tool in practice for agencies to meet the Executive Order. CV refers to a set of survey-based approaches for eliciting Hicksian compensating or equivalent surplus values for a hypothetical change in a good or program. A contingent market (private or political) scenario is typically described for implementing a proposed change.
While the CV approach is practically quite To extend the CV debate in a new direction, we attempt to mimic these various survey administration methods in various experimental treatments described below. As such, this research not only provides insights into the effects of the various survey administration methods, but also speaks to the plethora of validation studies that assume responses in the real payment treatment represent true preferences. Table 1 At this early stage, CEPA is a proposed research center to exam local and state environmental issues such as air and water pollution, endangered species protection, and biodiversity enhancement. Through careful research, solutions to important environmental problems can be advanced. The CEPA currently does not now have the funds required to begin. It will require $5,000 for start-up expenses. If everyone in this set of experiments were to contribute $20.00, these monies would be a sufficient beginning to cover the center's start-up cost.6 We are going to have a vote to decide whether or not all of you will pay $20.00 for this purpose. We are voting on the following proposition: Everyone in the room will contribute $20.00 to the UCF Center for Environmental Policy Analysis. The contribution will be used for the purpose of covering start-up expenses.7 Before the vote, participants were informed exactly how the majority rule referendum format operates, how monies will be collected (in the actual referenda cases), and given the opportunity for questions on the referendum mechanism. All respondents were then presented with a referendum-voting question with a fixed $20 payment amount for the same public good.8
A. Experimental Design
As summarized in Table 1 , the elicitation types are denoted Baseline, which is consistent with typical experimental treatments and many CV administration methods (in-person, mail, and telephone interviews) in that only the surveyor/government agency can observe each subject's response. In this case, the experimenter is aware of the choices since subjects' votes can be linked with a survey sheet that contains their name and other individualspecific particulars (see Appendix B). The second elicitation type is the Randomized Response (RR hereafter) approach, where the interviewer knows the individual response (Yes or No), but does not know whether it was to the referendum question, or to an alternative innocuous question.9 Accordingly, we expect that any upward 7 To ensure subjects that the money would actually go to CEPA, we noted in the experimental instructions: "We will not send cash. I will take your cash, write this check (show check) for (n X $20.00) and the check will be mailed to the center. I will put the check in this stamped envelope (show envelope) addressed to the center. I will ask one of you to put the envelope in the mailbox downstairs. When I receive a receipt for the money from the center, I will make it available for your inspection in front of room 319 in the CBA building." 8 This design choice closely follows Cummings et al.
(1997), among others, who provide each subject with a $10 participation fee and ask subjects to vote on a proposal to give $10 for the production and distribution of citizens' guides in New Mexico. We also ran pilot treatments where subjects first earned at least $20. These results, which are available upon request, provide qualitatively identical insights to the data described herein. One difference is that the percentage of Yes votes is lower in each treatment. 9 This approach was used to mimic the anonymous ballot box method. In very small scale pilot tests the two approaches yielded qualitatively similar insights so we opted to use the RR approach because it allows us to match subject-specific characteristics with responses. This area is ripe for future research. response effects associated with reciprocity and positive status effects are eliminated in the RR since the individual voting responses are entirely confidential. The final treatment is labeled Peer Group, and is identical to the Baseline treatment, except in this case 10 people are chosen randomly to stand up and inform the group of their response. Thus, in this treatment each individual answers the referendum question knowing that there is a possibility of having his or her response made public.10 Relative to the baseline, the RR treatment provides an increased degree of social isolation, while the Peer Group treatment provides a decreased degree of social isolation. Crossing each of these elicitation techniques with a hypothetical and actual treatment produces the six treatments in Table 1 : BASE-HYPO, BASE-ACTUAL, RR-HYPO, RR-ACTUAL, PEER-HYPO, and PEER-ACTUAL.11
Before proceeding to a discussion of the hypotheses, it is worthwhile to explain briefly our application of the RR method since it is rarely used in economics. We use the "unrelated question" design of Bernard G. Greenberg et al. (1969) , which is a randomization process that directs the respondent, with a probability con-10 In the Peer Group treatment, directly after the example of how the referendum works, and before the actual referendum question, participants are told on the written questionnaire: "Please note that we will be calling on 10 people to stand up and announce their response. For example, if I call John Doe, he must stand up and announce to the class how he voted." Subjects were aware that the experimental monitor had the survey and voting sheets in hand when he called the subjects' names to announce their vote. Thus, the subjects must reveal truthfully (in practice all did so). Note, also, that the referendum worked exactly as in the other treatments-it was based on voting from the entire group, not merely the 10 subjects who were called to announce their vote. This approach is intended to represent contingent surveys carried out with small groups and poorly controlled Web-based CV surveys.
11 Appendix A contains a copy of the Baseline actual treatment instructions. Instructions for the other treatments were identical except for the necessary changes. We interchange "hypothetical" and "HYPO" hereafter. At this point, we should note that subjects were given the chance to leave the experiment after they understood the rules. No subjects exited early. And, an astute reader will recognize that there are slight differences in group size across treatments (see Table 1 ), which could influence voting behavior because of its effect on the likelihood that someone is pivotal. To ensure that group sizes were not a confounding factor, we had subjects enter the large room from the rear and used cardboard row dividers to ensure subjects could not determine the exact group size. 12 In addition to unconditional tests, we examine our hypotheses within a conditional setting-e.g., estimate a probit regression of the form Pr(Yes) = f(X'X), where X is a set of explanatory variables gathered from the survey in Appendix B, and X is the vector of associated coefficients. We use the sequential testing procedure originally proposed in Joffre Swait and Jordan Louviere (1993). First, a pooled probit model is estimated with the optimum variance ratio (o-l/o2) for any two samples (1 and 2) derived from a grid search, where, for example, the standard deviation of the control sample, cr-, is set equal to one, and the standard deviation of the treatment sample is estimated freely. The null of the equality of the coefficient vector is tested by comparing this restricted log-likelihood value to the unrestricted log-likelihood value (sum of the two separate probits). An insignificant x2 value indicates that the coefficient vectors are not statistically different. The difference in the two variances is tested by comparing the unrestricted loglikelihood value with the restricted likelihood (a simple pooled probit). Finally, in order to conduct these hypotheses tests for the RR treatment, estimating the probit model for the RR sample must take account of the known randomization mechanism. Our approach follows that of Berrens et al. (1997) . The primary caveat to the notation of Berrens et al. (1997: pp. 255-58) is that our "bid" (t) was fixed at $20. Our calculated value for the probability that the constructed random number was between 0-10 ("1-p") was 0.077, as constructed from the mean of a matching random sample of 300 UCF students to our experimental sample (Berrens et al., 1997, used a value of 0.08). We also assumed that the probability a mother's birthday occurred in a given month ("p") was 0.083. ~~------------------- ~~------------------- ~~------------------- Interestingly, empirical evidence in Table 3 suggests that the proportion of Yes votes in the RR treatments is significantly lower than the a normally distributed random variable with mean (variance) equal to the sum of the means (variances). In our case the statistic equals the sum of the three independent statistics divided by the square root of three.
~~~~--------------------
proportion of Yes votes in comparable BASE and PEER treatments. Indeed, in terms of statistical and economic significance, the data suggest that the effect of varying social isolation is in the range of the comparative-static effect of varying the monetary consequentiality of the decision. For example, a comparison between the percentage of Yes votes across BASE and RR (PEER) yields a difference of 0.18 (0.12) in the actual treatment and 0.20 (0.10) in the hypothetical treatment; overall these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels (except for the BASE versus PEER comparisons, which are nearly significant using a onesided alternative). If one considers the extreme comparison case-RR versus PEER-we find that whereas 50 percent of respondents voted Yes in the actual PEER treatment, only 20 percent voted Yes in the RR actual treatment, a difference that is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level.16
While these results are certainly suggestive that social isolation matters a great deal, no attempt has been made to control for the possible influence of socioeconomic characteristics, and for this we turn to empirical estimates from various probit regressions. Table 4 presents empirical estimates from five distinct probit models, which each control for income (LnINC) and 16 Our finding that varying social isolation has a similar percentage effect on voting patterns as varying the monetary consequentiality of the decision may even be considered a lower bound estimate since the difference between hypothetical and actual voting patterns may be increased by our use of an open referendum (Richard Carson et al., 1999) . Further, the influence of social isolation may be muted if subjects believed that the experimenter had access to their social security numbers. and significant at the p < 0.05 level. In addition, the estimated coefficients on BASE and PEER are both positive and significant at the p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels. Hence, in this particular model there is evidence for both hypothetical bias and a social isolation effect, and they are of roughly similar magnitudes, though the social isolation effect is slightly larger.18
gender (MALE).17 The empirical models differ
One criticism of our dummy variable approach is that it forces the variances of the different treatment samples to be equivalent (Haab et al., 1999) . To amend this potential shortcoming, we ran separate probit models with identical sets of explanatory variables (CONSTANT, LnINC, and MALE) and no treatment dummy variables. Summary results, which are available on the AER Web site (http://www.aeaweb.org/acr/contents/) in tabular form, reveal evidence consonant with Haab et al. (1999) in that there are differences in variances within our data: in comparing HYPO versus ACTUAL, the evidence supports the hypothesis of a significant difference at the p < 0.01 level. The null hypothesis between the HYPO and ACTUAL variances, however, cannot be rejected for the RR and the PEER treatments. Further, when looking at the HYPO and ACTUAL samples separately, there is evidence of a treatment effect, where the variance in the RR treatment is significantly different from that of the BASE and PEER treatments. These results confirm our unconditional findings reported above, and suggest the significant role that social isolation plays in the valuation process. 18 The importance of social isolation is further illustrated in column 5 of Table 4-a pooled model that includes interaction terms HYPO*BASE and HYPO*PEER. In this particular specification, estimated coefficients on HYPO, HYPO*BASE, BASE, and HYPO*ACTUAL are not significantly different from zero, either individually or jointly. Yet the treatment variables remain statistically significant (jointly), and we again find that subjects randomly inserted into the PEER treatment vote Yes significantly more than respondents placed in the RR treatment.
III. Discussion
Recently there has been a lively debate about whether, and to what extent, "hypothetical bias" permeates benefit estimation in contingent markets. Given that benefit-cost analyses are required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, investigating potential biases in contingent valuation has great practical importance. This paper extends the debate in a new direction by exploring the link between social isolation and stated preferences. Examining data from nearly 300 subjects placed randomly into one of six experimental treatment cells, we find that social isolation plays a considerable role. Indeed, its magnitude is roughly comparable to the degree of hypothetical bias observed.
Besides its importance for practical implementation of contingent valuation, our findings raise serious concerns about the experimental results in the literature purporting to measure hypothetical bias given the specific social context in which some of the studies have been conducted. The following questionnaire concerns the University of Central Florida's proposed Center for Environmental Policy Analysis (CEPA). It should take only several minutes to complete; all answers will be treated as confidential information and are an important input to our study. Except when asked for a specific number, most of the questions can be answered simply by checking the appropriate response. Your time and consideration are appreciated.
At this early stage, CEPA is a proposed research center to examine local and state environmental issues such as air and water pollution, endangered species protection, and biodiversity enhancement. Through careful research, solutions to important environmental problems can be advanced.
The CEPA currently does not now have the funds required to begin. It will require $5,000 for start-up expenses. If everyone in this set of experiments were to contribute $20.00, these monies would be a sufficient beginning to cover the center's start-up cost.
We are going to have a vote to decide whether or not all of us will pay $20.00 for this purpose. We are voting on the following proposition: Everyone in the room will contribute $20.00 to the UCF Center for Environmental Policy Analysis. The contribution will be used for the purpose of covering start-up expenses.
Here's how the vote works.
1. If more than 50% of you vote "yes" on this proposition, all of you will pay $20.00-I will collect $20.00 from each of you-and we will send this money to the UCF CEPA with instructions that the money is to be used to fund start-up expenses. We will not send cash. I will take your cash, write this check (show check) for (n X $20.00) and the check will be mailed to the center. I will put the check in this stamped envelope (show envelope) addressed to the center. I will ask one of you to put the envelope in the mailbox downstairs. When I receive a receipt for the money from the center, I will make it available for your inspection in front of room 319 in the CBA building. 2. If 50% or fewer of you vote "yes" on this proposition, no one will pay $20.00, we will not send a check to the center and the start-up expenses will not be gathered. We are now passing out a ballot. Remember how the vote works. If more than 50% vote "yes" we will collect $20.00 from each of you, and we will mail this check to the center right here today. If 50% or less vote "yes," no one will pay $20.00, and we will not mail this check to the center. Any questions? 
